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Abstract
The purpose of this study is to provide a theoretical framework that can be applied 
to both religious and secular terrorism. It is suggested that terrorism can be divided 
into two categories; practical and ideological.  The first category, terrorists with 
practical objectives like sovereignty or end to repression, are generated by local 
conflicts. These local conflicts can also have a global impact, thus inspiring others 
sharing that  ideology or religion to take up terrorism. For this  second type of 
terrorists, ideology comes after the cause as a means to achieve an end. Ideology 
becomes both the means and the end. The theory is applied to two empirical cases, 
one  being the  West  German terrorism of  1968-1993,  the  other  being  Islamic 
terrorism 1998-2005. The two cases are compared and the similarities between the 
two cases despite differences between religious and secular terrorism are used to 
support the validity of the theory. The findings indicate that secular and religious 
terrorism share some characteristics which could be used to analyse the emergence 
of terrorism past and present.
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1 Introduction
Today, the issue of global  terrorism is present in many aspects of modern life, 
ranging from the “global war on terror” to increased security measures on airports 
and other public facilities. Ever since September 11th 2001, the whole world has 
been made aware of the presence and impact of global terrorism. It is, however, 
easy to  forget  that  the  world experienced a  period  in  1968-1993 that  was not 
entirely different.  Then,  scholars  attempted  to  analyse the  particulars of  Latin 
American society, of Italian politics and of West German middle-class students. 
This type of contextualising of terrorism is again seen today. Many scholars and 
experts today focus to no small extent on the particulars of Islamic terrorism in 
terms of religious doctrine and cultural heritage in their pursuit of answers that can 
help explain this surge of violence. The frightening aspects of terrorism and the 
polarisation it aims to produce further reinforce this tendency, just as it did in 1968-
1993. 
When I read contemporary literature on terrorism from the past, it struck me just 
how similar it is to the material being written today about Islamic terrorism. It also 
struck me that terrorism then is not that different from terrorism now, regardless of 
all  the  claims to  the contrary. This  made me question the contextualisation of 
terrorism, i.e. the tendency to try to understand terrorism based on a close study of 
its  immediate  context  rather  than  by  looking  for  recurring traits  inherent  in 
terrorism.
My ambition with this thesis is to take a different approach and instead focus on 
looking at terrorism from a wider and more abstract perspective. My aim is  to 
further an understanding based on research where the lessons from both the past 
and present are taken into account and where terrorism is understood as a recurring 
phenomenon,  not  something that's  unique to  particular contexts.  This  approach 
could then yield results that could provide some instruments  for understanding 
terrorism beyond the case-specific explanations so often heard today.
I will not attempt to write a “general theory on terrorism”, that would be too 
presumptuous and hopelessly optimistic. I will, however, attempt to uncover some 
of the similarities between terrorism past and present in my own pursuit of answers 
devoid of particularities. I have developed a theoretical framework which I argue 
can provide a more detailed understanding of how different types of terrorism can 
interact indirectly with each other, creating “terrorism waves” such as the one in 
Western Europe in 1968-1993 as well as the one we see today.
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1.1 The study
There  is  a  tendency  among  analysts,  especially  contemporary  ones,  to  pay 
considerable attention to the specific context of various types of terrorism. I argue 
that this approach prevents the establishment of generally applicable theories which 
could help us understand terrorism as a general phenomenon. The contextualised 
approach also puts the objectivity of the researcher at risk by forcing the researcher 
to take a stern stand against that which is being studied lest  he or she is to be 
considered an apologist or sympathiser. The purpose of this thesis is to break that 
pattern by taking a cumulative approach through the study of the past and present, 
both in terms of theories and empirical material.  The objective is to search for 
similarities rather than differences. 
One of the recurring patterns in scholarly analysis of contemporary terrorism 
both in the past and present is the tendency to dismiss contemporary terrorism (but 
seldom  historical  terrorism)  as  nothing  more  than  hate-driven  campaigns  of 
destruction. To me that sounds like a simplification. I do not find it likely that so 
many would risk or even sacrifice their lives out of nothing more than sheer love of 
carnage. Some scholars argue that there is a rationality to terrorism1, that for all its 
destructiveness and brutality, the perpetrators of  terror are nevertheless  rational 
actors seeking specific outcomes beyond that of destruction for destruction's sake. I 
find this explanation to be more plausible and have used it as the foundation for my 
study. 
I will attempt to provide a more detailed understanding of the mechanisms that 
make terrorists appear, and disappear. Can generally applicable theories be used to 
explain the recurring appearance and disappearance of terrorism? Do different types 
of terrorism have similar traits that transcend differences in religion, doctrine and 
era? What makes homegrown terrorists appear and deliver lethal blows against their 
fellow citizens, claiming solidarity with some far-away cause to such an extent that 
they are willing to attack the very society they grew up in?
In order to find answers to these questions I will describe what I consider to be a 
causal feedback mechanism between various contexts that can help explain how 
structural factors may lead to  a  significant  increase  in  some types of  terrorist 
activities. Furthermore, I argue that these factors are relevant across time, doctrine 
and culture. 
I argue that the main distinction between different types of terrorism should not 
be  made along the  lines  of  religion versus ideology but  rather  that  the  major 
difference lies  between  practical  and  ideological terrorism. The former has  an 
easily defined objective outside the realm of ideology, such as sovereignty for a 
specific territory or the toppling of a government in favour of a specific alternative. 
The latter is built on an abstract basis, the objective of the terrorist activities comes 
from the chosen ideology. In the case practical terrorism, the cause pre-dates the 
ideology. In the case of ideological terrorism, the situation is the exact opposite; the 
ideology comes first and provides in itself the reason for violent action.
1 For example Telhami (2005)
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Once this distinction has been made, I argue that the ability to recruit among the 
various practical terrorist organisations is simply a result of the stability of their 
cause. The conflicts over the Basque region and Northern Ireland, for example, 
have persisted for quite some time. This has provided a stable foundation for the 
ETA and IRA. Recent de-escalations of these two conflicts have reduced terrorist 
activities related to these causes. The level of terrorist activities is linked to the 
nature of  the conflict but the common trait is  that as long as the conflict over 
something of such a practical nature persists, terrorist organisations involved in 
such struggles will have stability. Ideological terrorism on the other hand is highly 
susceptible to fluctuations since it does not have this type of stable foundation. Just 
as ideas can change and develop, the ideological terrorist organisations can emerge 
and disappear following global trends, media coverage, etc.
I argue that this distinction should be applicable to terrorism of both the past 
and present. Thus stripped of context, the theory can be applied to both religiously 
motivated and secular terrorism in the past, present and hopefully also the future. 
One of the limits of the theory is that I have focused on the type of ideological 
terrorists which claim solidarity with other groups. This excludes the isolationist 
groups,  such as Aum Shinrikyo. These groups are difficult to explain using my 
theoretical framework, they most likely need a category of their own.
1.2 Methodology
I intend to develop a theoretical framework by de-contextualising existing theories 
on terrorism as well as adding my own theories. This de-contextualising is done by 
removing what I consider to be superfluous contextual angles concerning specific 
characteristics linked to the specific religions or ideologies. By combining different 
theories on different types of terrorism as well as adding my own theories to the 
mix, I aim to create a more generally applicable model. I will then test this model 
on two empirical cases, being the Red Army Faction (RAF)  in  West Germany 
1968-1993 and contemporary Islamic terrorism 1998-2005. In addition, I will also 
compare these  two cases to  emphasise similarities.  Although this  design is  not 
within the parameters of a strictly performed comparative study along the lines of 
Mill's method of agreement, as for example defined by Landman (2004, pp. 29-30), 
it nevertheless has similar dimensions. 
My two cases have been deliberately chosen because of the differences between 
them.  The  West  German  terrorism  is  a  case  of  secular  left-wing  terrorism 
perpetrated by Europeans against Europeans in the past and is well-documented, 
including material that shows the views of the perpetrators themselves. The Islamic 
terrorism is  a  case of  contemporary terrorism with  religious and clearly global 
dimensions, still surrounded by much speculation due to the difficulties involved in 
obtaining accurate data on events of this type that are still unfolding. By applying 
my theoretical framework to these two cases and comparing the results I intend to 
lend some methodological weight to the similarities.
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The main reason I chose not to conduct a pure comparative study is also the 
most important difference between the two cases; we do not yet know how the 
Islamic terrorism case will develop in the future whereas the West German case 
ended decades ago.
1.3 The material 
I  will  make use of  theoretical  literature  on terrorism of  both the  religious and 
political kinds, for example Peste (2003), Laqueur (1987), Griset & Mahan (2003) 
and Sprinzak (1999). In addition, I will use some of the recently published books on 
the left-wing terrorism of the 1970s which make use of information not previously 
available, such as recent testimonies from former members of the RAF, for example 
the detailed description of the events surrounding the Stockholm embassy siege of 
1975 written by Hansén & Nordqvist  (2005).  I hope that these new sources of 
empirical data can be used to develop the existing theories on political violence 
since  they  can  paint  a  more detailed  picture of  a  particular era  and  breed of 
terrorism which is limited in time and space.
Due to the previously mentioned tendency to over-contextualise research on 
terrorism, I will treat conclusions presented in research on contemporary terrorism 
with caution. This applies both to the research on the terrorism of the 1960s-1980s 
written during that same period and to the research we see today. 
1.4 Definitions
Defining “terrorism” is difficult. There is no single broadly accepted definition. 
Laqueur (1987, p. 11) states that “[...] recently, the term 'terrorism' (like 'guerilla') 
has  been used in  so  many  different  senses  as  to  become almost meaningless, 
covering  almost any,  and  not  necessarily political, act  of  violence”.  However, 
Whittaker  mentions  one  definition  which  will  suffice  for  this  thesis,  being; 
“terrorism is the premeditated threat or use of violence by subnational groups or 
clandestine individuals intended to intimidate and coerce governments, to promote 
political, religious or ideological outcomes, and to inculcate fear among the public 
at large” (Whittaker 2007, p. 10). With the concept of terrorism thus defined, I will 
also define some of the factors used to explain it. There are many different ways of 
explaining  the  root  causes  behind  terrorism. Sprinzak (1999,  p.  312)  mentions 
violence, repression and arbitrariness. Whittaker (2007, p. 84) brings up oppression 
and hostility towards minorities on behalf of the majority. Yet others frequently 
mention  deprivation,  such  as  in  the  shape  of  poverty  and  disenfranchisement 
(Crayton 1985, p. 34) or more abstract forms of social and economic deprivation 
(Borum 2005, p. 19)
In this thesis, I will not focus on the specifics related to these factors. In order to 
facilitate my theorising, I will frequently use the expression  grievances as a wide 
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definition  including,  but  not  limited  to,  the  above mentioned  examples. Some 
additional grievances could for example be purely ideological, such as the sheer 
existence of a transnational capitalist system or the presence of troops of a specific 
nationality in a specific area. 
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2 A new perspective on terrorism
In this chapter, I argue first that theories on, and perceptions of, terrorism have a 
tendency to be too contextualised and present examples of how this can negatively 
affect the accuracy of the research at hand. Secondly, I argue that a distinction 
should be made between the local and global contexts in order to understand what I 
consider  to  be  the  main  distinction  between  different  types  of  terrorism; that 
between  practical and  ideological.  I  present more  detailed  explanations  of  my 
theoretical  concepts  in  the  chapters  below.  In  order  to  make  the  theoretical 
framework more comprehensible, I  have included anecdotal  empirical examples 
throughout the chapter.
2.1 The necessity of de-contextualisation
The contemporary debate on terrorism is more often than not focused on specific 
traits of the organisations that are most active today, the religious component being 
one such characteristic. Some previous periods of terrorism, such as 1968-1993, the 
1920s-1930s and 1890s-1900s, have also been analysed with a focus on uniqueness 
rather than  similarities, for  example by  Laqueur (1987,  pp.  85-87)  and  Amon 
(1985). 
I  argue  that in  order to  develop a  more cumulative  and objective study of 
terrorism, the contextualisation of terrorism must be treated with more caution than 
it has generally been so far. There is a tendency among many scholars to let their 
own context colour their  theories and  judgement to  such an extent  that  it  can 
jeopardise their ability to objectively study the phenomenon of terrorism. In 2002, 
Whittaker (2007, p. 94) wrote the following;
Outside  the group nobody  can see the sense  of the Basque  ETA,  and the Tamil 
Tigers, pursuing their campaign of violence when much of what they are wanting 
has been given them through compromise,  agreement or grant of more autonomy. 
Their  subsidiary  motives  of  targeting  people  and  places  become  subsumed  in  a 
narrow, ultimate motive of ensuring survival. Whatever the degree of risk (and the 
irritated bewilderment of everybody else) the terrorists continue to terrorize.
Whittaker's acidic condemnation of the contemporary ETA and his utter conviction 
that it fights only for the sake of fighting itself and ultimately its own survival 
makes him conclude that “the terrorists will continue to terrorize”.  However, in 
March of 2006, according to a Basque news source the ETA declared a “permanent 
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cease-fire” in favour of more peaceful negotiations (ETA cease-fire). Thus, the ETA 
proved itself capable of responding to changes in the local context, albeit slowly. A 
more objective review of the ETA could have shown that  the organisation has 
become less active over the years and that their decision to cease using terrorism 
was not entirely unpredictable. 
In the late 1970s, Amon (1985) linked the wave of terrorism in Western Europe 
with  development.  His  explanation  was  that  because  Western  civilisation had 
reached a certain stage, it had turned to self-destruction, stating that “[t]errorism is 
just the last stage in the age of revolutions” (Amon 1985, p. 17). His explanation 
was heavily contextualised and looked to the Western cultural heritage for answers. 
At the time of writing, during the late 1970s, the most prominent type of terrorism 
was  the  homegrown Western  European  type.  It  is  quite  understandable that 
someone analysing the phenomenon there and then would be tempted to seek for 
specific explanations to what was then perceived by many to be Western problem 
with Western perpetrators and Western victims. The large wave of Middle Eastern 
terror that  started  in  Lebanon was  yet  to  come. Today Amon's  theories seem 
outlandish and outdated. Today terrorism is thought by many to be a phenomenon 
carried out  by Middle Eastern perpetrators  and  thus many explanations  instead 
focus on the specifics appropriate to the Middle East.
One  of  my  basic  arguments is  that  the  study  of  terrorism must  be  de-
contextualised in order to achieve a wider understanding. The two above examples 
show the dangers of letting one's context influence the analysis to an extent where it 
can damage the accuracy of one's research. An objective review of terrorism which 
aims to achieve understanding rather than delivering redundant condemnation is 
still a sensitive issue when it comes to contemporary terrorism. Nicholson (2005, p. 
2)  states  that  “[w]e reflexively  condemn terrorism after each new outrage  [...] 
without a real attempt to understand and dissect it. Dissection is clinical, stripped of 
emotion, and does not imply approval: I emphasize the point lest any be tempted to 
view this essay as an apologia. It is not.” The fact that Nicholson felt that it was 
necessary  to  include  such  a  disclaimer  illustrates  how  delicate  a  matter 
contemporary terrorism is and how this can have a negative impact on research. 
2.2 Distinguishing the local from the global
Analyses of terrorism past and present more often than not distinguish between 
politically motivated and religiously motivated terrorism or revolve around similar 
doctrinal concepts, for example the distinctions along the lines of crime, politics, 
warfare,  communication  and  religious  fundamentalism  suggested  by  Schmid 
(2004).
Whittaker  (2007,  p.  84)  describes  motives  for  terrorism  in  general  by 
mentioning “circumstances that make the road to violence the only way out of 
despair”. He states that “The root of that dissatisfaction may be oppression by a 
military regime, as in Argentina, or the prejudice and hostility of a majority who are 
making living by a minority insufferable[...]”. Sprinzak (1999,  p. 312) makes a 
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similar argument when he states that “[v]iolence from below is often triggered by 
previous  violence  from  above  (and  if  not  violence,  at  least  repression  and 
arbitrariness)” [original italics].  Whittaker's and Sprinzak's explanations are quite 
relevant for what I define as the local context but can hardly explain the emergence 
of terrorist organisations neither in Western Europe nor the US. The governments in 
France, West Germany, Belgium, Italy and the other democratic West European 
nations plagued by terrorism in 1968-1993 were not military regimes.  Although 
some of them can be said to have had tensions between the majority and some 
minority groups, this was hardly more than is common in many parts of the world 
and in no more than a few very small organisations did the terrorism in Western 
Europe have  a  majority/minority dimension.  There  were violent  confrontations 
between  police  and  demonstrators  in  1967-1968  which  in  some  cases  led  to 
casualties but the governments were nevertheless  not significantly more violent 
then than they are today when faced with such situations. Still, despite the similar 
approach taken by the authorities, we see no left-leaning radical terrorists neither in 
Europe nor the US today.
This  is  why  I  argue  that  the  main  distinction  between  different  types  of 
terrorism should be one between largely practical and largely ideological terrorism. 
The former has an easily defined objective outside the realm of ideology, such as 
sovereignty for a specific territory or the toppling of a government in favour of a 
specific  alternative.  These  objectives  are  not  linked  to  any  specific  political 
orientation. Ideology, to the extent it is present, thus becomes the means to achieve 
a practical end. 
The opposite is largely ideological terrorism. The goal is then ideological, in the 
case of  left-wing terrorists usually revolution for  the  sake of  revolution itself. 
Rarely do the terrorists then have ambitions to become the government themselves 
and neither do they advocate a specific group of people or any specific party as an 
alternative to the existing regime. Revolution becomes a goal in itself, ideology 
becomes both the means and the end. 
Whereas practical terrorists are mainly inspired by local factors, which I call the 
local  context,  usually  manifested  by  a  specific  territory  or  government,  the 
ideological terrorists have a more abstract foundation which is far more susceptible 
to influences from the worldwide contemporary political climate, which I call the 
global context. 
These two types of terrorism have re-emerged countless times in history and the 
former has also influenced the latter. They are nevertheless two separate types of 
terrorism, one relies on a largely stable factor while the latter relies on a largely 
fluctuating factor. This is why the former tends to persist whereas the latter tends to 
dissolve  eventually,  following  changes  in  the  global  trends.  West  European 
terrorism, for example, featured circa 10 years of peak activity.
8
2.3 The local context
The  local context  is  essentially the sum of  objective grievances present in  the 
country in which the terrorists appear. By “objective” I mean that the local context 
grievances are such that people of most political or religious persuasions would find 
them  disturbing  or  outright  unacceptable,  such  as  repression  or  denial  of 
sovereignty. One example of an organisation whose terror was based on the local 
context is the Russian Narodnaya Volya, active during the 1870s-1880s. One of the 
leaders, Zhelyabov, “propounded the idea that the regime must be attacked again 
and again until  it  was forced to grant political freedom by which it  would be 
possible to engage in peaceful propaganda activities” (Ivianski 1985, p. 90). The 
terrorists may seek inspiration by copying foreign terrorist organisations or even 
seek direct support from foreigners, but they are nevertheless fighting for their own 
sake first and foremost. They may claim solidarity with others but they will not 
extend this so far as to claim that international solidarity is their primary inspiration. 
They will seek support locally and internationally but they will need to rally at least 
some degree of support from their countrymen to achieve their goal.
They may refer to different types of ideologies, but these will mostly be means 
to achieve an end. The basis for the struggle can consequently be identified as an 
objective  outside any  specific  ideological  context.  Fighting  for  sovereignty  or 
attempting to  secure  power  for  the  sake  of  improving  the  positions  of  the 
organisation's members are two examples.
2.4 The global context
Every time period has its own global context, at any given time it is the essence of 
global events and political fluctuations, more often than not armed conflicts provide 
sources  of  polarisation.  The  global  context  can  be  more  or  less  radical, 
contemporary history has seen recurring periods of intense global radicalism, such 
as the 1890s-1900s, the 1920s-1930s, the 1960s-1970s and today radicalism of the 
religious kind has been intensifying since the mid-1990s, taking off in earnest in 
2001. 
Frequently, conflicts which are localised even though they may involve global 
distances between the belligerents, will influence the global context. A war may 
become a globally discussed issue which people around the world take a stand on, 
thus spreading a  polarisation  from the local sphere to  the global.  Examples of 
conflicts of this type which have had a significant impact on the global context are 
the Vietnam War 1965-1975, the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians since 
1948, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan 1979-1989, the conflict in Iraq since 2003, 
etc. 
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2.5 Practical terrorism
I argue that a well-entrenched struggle for sovereignty, such as in Northern Ireland 
and  the  Basques,  provides  a  stable  cause  since  it  is  based  on  political  and 
geographical factors which have been present for quite some time and which are 
less prone to change. Consequently, the terrorist activities related to these causes 
tend to be present as long as the issue around which they revolve is present. The 
conflicts over the Basques region and Northern Ireland have historical roots. In 
these  cases,  the  grievances  of  the  local  population  are  directly  related  to 
sovereignty, whether it is desired or feared. Despite the recurrence of periods of 
calm and violence which seems to indicate  fluctuations,  these  causes and their 
capacity  to  recruit  new followers seems  rather  stable compared to  the  purely 
ideological terrorist organisations which have come and gone while the IRA2 and 
ETA have persisted. It would seem as if a solution related to the issue at hand rather 
than solutions related to the issue of terrorism per se is the most effective way to 
resolve the situation. In Northern Ireland, this focus seems to have reduced the IRA 
activities considerably. As previously mentioned, in Spain the degree of autonomy 
granted to the Basque region and the nature of the negotiations on this issue seems 
to have had an impact on the intensity of  ETA operations  to the extent that a 
“permanent cease-fire” has  been declared by the organisation.  This  new era of 
relative peace in both Northern Ireland and the Basque region indicates that the 
status of  the  cause is  strongly related to the level  of  terrorist activities.  When 
confrontation is no longer required for furthering the cause, terrorist activity drops 
accordingly. 
2.6 Ideological terrorism
In contrast to the practical nature of the causes of the IRA and ETA, there have 
been  numerous  terrorist  organisations  without  any  links  to  significant  local 
grievances, specific geographical areas or ethnic groups. Their struggles have not 
been about clearly defined political objectives.  Instead, their focus has been on 
abstractions  and  ideological  utopias.  Nicholson's  (2005,  p.  2)  describes  the 
phenomenon with the following statement; “[t]errorists who lash out from hatred 
but without concrete and achievable political goals, including those whose political 
goals are so sweeping as to be delusional [...] are practically, if not philosophically, 
nihilists with  nowhere to go”. Clearly, the terrorism described by Nicholson is 
different from the previously mentioned terrorism as perpetrated by organisations 
like the ETA or IRA. Nicholson simply dismisses it  as “nihilism”. I argue that 
there's more to learn about this type of terrorism, which I call ideological terrorism. 
Like Western Europe, the United States suffered a wave of terrorism during the 
1960s and 1970s, albeit on a smaller scale. Among the homegrown organisations 
2 In this case, I include both the Provisional IRA (PIRA) and the Official IRA (OIRA) in my wider definition of 
the IRA
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were the Weather Underground3, the Black Panthers and the Symbionese Liberation 
Army (SLA). Commenting on these organisations,  Griset & Mahan (2003, p. 87) 
state that;  “[m]any  of  them were involved with  universities  and  were brought 
together  because of  antiwar and  civil  rights  issues that  were  highly politicized 
during the decade”. Although the Vietnam War can be considered a local grievance, 
these organisations seem to have had goals reaching beyond that of ending the war. 
For example, one Weather Underground communiqué claiming responsibility for 
the bombing of the New York City Police headquarters stated that “The time is 
now. Political power grows out of a gun, a Molotov, a riot, a commune and from 
the soul of the people” (Griset & Mahan 2003, p. 87). The language is abstract, but 
the statement that “the time is now” and the Mao-influenced “Political power grows 
out of a gun” are indicators of the revolutionary ideology of the Weathermen. 
Interestingly enough, with the end of the 1970s, the US homegrown terrorist 
groups like the Weather Underground and the SLA disappeared. It would be easy to 
accredit this to successful anti-terrorist campaigns and arrests but the fact remains 
that  in  1999-2002 no  less than  five  former members of  the  SLA were  finally 
brought to justice.  Thus,  they had been at large for nearly thirty years without 
committing acts of terrorism (Griset & Mahan 2003, p. 88). During the wave of 
terror in Western Europe in the 1960s and 1970s, several active terrorist cells had 
around five members so insufficient numbers would not be an adequate explanation 
for their passiveness. Fusako Shigenobu, one of the founders and leaders of the 
Japanese Red Army, is another example of a notorious terrorist who was at large for 
decades. Active in the 1970s, he wasn't apprehended until 2000 (Griset & Mahan 
2003, p. 47).
There are no indications that these former terrorists at large attempted to rebuild 
any kind of fighting organisation or recruit new followers. Instead it seems as if 
they had simply abandoned their struggle altogether. I argue that the most likely 
explanation is  that  their  “inspiration” simply had disappeared. The basis  which 
formed the terrorist groups of which they were once part was no longer there.  
Peste (2003, p. 262) claims that one of the explaining factors behind terrorism is 
a conflict between the terrorist group and its social surroundings. This sounds too 
blunt  to  me.  In  the  local  context,  it  is  not  difficult  to  imagine  how  radical 
individuals  could  be  drawn  into  conflicts  with  their  social  surroundings,  in 
particular representatives  of  a  repressive establishment.  In  the  case  of  purely 
ideological terrorists the situation is quite different. They are not part of a local 
conflict and thus not subjected to a conflict with the establishment of an intensity 
that can rival that of the local contexts inspiring the practical terrorists. Once they 
have resorted to terrorism they will naturally be drawn into a violent conflict with 
the authorities, but that does not explain how they turned into terrorists in the first 
place.
I argue that one of the hallmarks of terrorists in general is the perception that the 
use  of  peaceful methods is  futile  and/or  dangerous and  that  the  enemy is  the 
aggressor.  In  the  case  of  ideological  terrorists,  this  can  be  as  abstract  as  the 
perception that collective violence is being perpetrated against a widely defined 
group to which the would-be terrorist perceives him- or herself to be affiliated or 
3 Also known as “The Weathermen” or simply “Weatherman”
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sympathetic  to.  If  a  group  of  people  feel  alienated  from society, for  example 
because of their political affiliation or ethnic identity, then they will be more prone 
to identify with groups outside society. 
In the above case, the homegrown US terrorists were influenced both by the 
global context and the local. The alienation from the political system brought by 
their radical left-wing ideology made them identify more closely with foreign left-
wing groups than their own society. This made them susceptible to influences from 
the global context. The local context also had an influence through the existence of 
factors such as  racial  discrimination and  the  draft,  both  of  which  presented a 
potential threat to their personal safety and that of their friends. Neither the draft 
nor racial discrimination, however, are unique phenomena. Both have been present 
in a multitude of nations over the years without sparking terrorism. 
Consequently, I argue that the global context was the deciding factor in the US, 
the draft and other local context factors merely fuelled the fire. One example that 
supports this conclusion is the confused agendas of the ideological groups. The 
SLA is particularly interesting since their global context influences also extended to 
the mysticism of  the hippie era, which for example made them adopt symbols 
drawn from mysticism, such as the cobra in their banner, claimed to be “a 170,000-
year-old sign signifying God and life” (Laqueur 1987, p. 245).
The ideological terrorist links violent acts both abroad and within his or her own 
country together  and is  quick to interpret escalations  in  other countries against 
perceived comrades as harbingers of things to come in his or her own country or to 
his or her own person. This was for example the case in Italy in 1975, where the 
Red Brigades linked the events in Chile to the elections in Italy and acted violently 
to prevent what they thought was an imminent extreme right-wing coup d'état. The 
Red Brigades believed that the Pinochet coup in response to Allende's left-wing 
parliamentary victory would be repeated in Italy as a consequence of  left-wing 
successes in local elections (Ruggiero 2005, pp. 295-296).
Although the Red Brigades could refer to local grievances as well, this motive 
for violent action was inspired by the global context. 
2.7 Context & regenerative capacity
Since  terrorist  organisations  are  constantly  clashing  with  security  and  law 
enforcement organisations,  which  frequently results  in  terrorists  being killed or 
captured, all active terrorist organisations require a steady flow of new recruits. 
Without this influx of new personnel, the terrorist organisation will eventually cease 
to exist. In  order  to  gain new recruits, motivated candidates must emerge  and 
volunteer to fill the ranks of the terrorist organisation.
I argue that the stability of the context determines the overall stability of the 
terrorist activities. With a sufficiently stable context, the terrorist organisation(s) 
pursuing the cause will be able to re-emerge in new guises even after the most 
effective police actions simply because new volunteers will step up and take over 
even if there is very little left of the old organisation. 
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For  example,  during  most  of  the  20th century,  the  British  and  Spanish 
governments have struggled to defeat the IRA and the ETA respectively. Despite all 
their efforts, these organisations have turned out to be impossible to destroy by 
resorting to police and military action. The British and Spanish governments have 
now abandoned their previously ruthless military campaigns of assassination and 
crackdowns against the IRA and ETA and today's far more peaceful approach with 
negotiations at its core seems to reap far bigger rewards since both the IRA and 
ETA are inactive today. Changes in the local contexts have had an impact on these 
causes and thus also on the organisations fighting for them.
Several ideological terrorist organisations were also able to re-emerge during 
their most active period during the 1970s, despite having large portions of their 
leadership and  members  arrested  or  killed.  The  SLA is  one  example.  After a 
confrontation with  the  police  that  resulted  in  the  death of  six  of  the  leading 
members of  the  SLA, which was a  very small organisation  to begin with,  the 
surviving members were able to recruit new followers and continue their struggle. 
After  the  1970s,  the  remaining  SLA members ceased  recruiting and  split  up, 
abandoning their terrorist campaign altogether until they were arrested and brought 
to justice in 1999-2002 (70's Radical Bombing Case). 
I argue that both these cases are examples of how context will not only influence 
the appearance of terrorism but also its regenerative capacity. The same context that 
makes terrorism appear will also allow it to regenerate when the authorities have 
dealt  severe blows to the existing organisations.  The fluctuation  aspect plays a 
major role. In the case of practical terrorism, the organisations have a very high 
regenerative capacity due to the stability of their cause. When more peaceful means 
of furthering the cause become acceptable to these organisations, they can cease 
their  operations  voluntarily.  The  ideological  terrorist  organisations  follow  a 
different pattern. In their case, their context is susceptible to far more fluctuations 
and rather than switching over to different strategies, they seem to simply abandon 
their cause. They cease to recruit new members and conduct terrorist operations 
altogether, instead abandoning their old cause in search of new peaceful lives in 
hiding.
2.8 Summary: the local-global causal connection
Above I have described the difference between the local and global contexts and 
how these are linked to practical and ideological terrorism. I argue that there is a 
difference in causality behind their appearances. In the case of practical terrorism, 
the  local  context  spawns  terrorists  who  then  adopt  an  ideology.  Ideological 
terrorists on the other hand start out with an ideology and then resort to terrorism 
mostly as a result of outside influences. Their ideology provides the foundation, the 
global context the spark (see illustration 1). 
I  argue that the  practical terrorist organisations  emerge  as a  result of  local 
objective grievances. Their goals are more than anything intended to solve the local 
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problems at  hand,  regardless  of  the ideology they choose as  their  means. The 
conflicts which involve these organisations have an impact on the global context 
and can provide inspiration for the ideological terrorist organisations.
The  ideological  organisations  do  not  emerge  as  a  result  of  objective  local 
grievances even though they often incorporate the local context into their agenda, 
their grievances are primarily global and subjective, i.e. directly related to their 
ideology. This is reflected in their objectives, which take on a far more abstract and 
far-reaching dimension than those of the practical terrorists. As long as the local 
grievances and local conflicts which have spawned the practical terrorists remain, 
they are likely to persist as organisations since new recruits will fill the ranks of the 
fallen and arrested in the terrorist units. The ideological terrorist organisations on 
the other hand are more susceptible to fluctuations. When the global trends become 
less  concerned with  the  specific  local  conflicts  which  inspired the  ideological 
terrorists, their foundation will start to dissolve.  Since they usually do not have 
much in the way of a local conflict to rely upon for new recruits, this eventually 
leads to the complete  destruction of the ideological terrorist unit  when the last 
members are arrested or simply decide to cease their struggle.  The latter seems 
fairly  common  since  many  terrorist  members  belonging  to  a  number  of 
organisations which had ceased to exist during the 1980s were at large for years and 
even decades without pursuing their previous goals, living rather peaceful lives.
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Illustration 1: The local-global causal connection
3 Terrorism of the past
In this chapter, I present the empirical data on the West German terrorism of 1968-
1993 and apply my theoretical framework as a means of analysing it. I describe the 
origins and decline of West German terrorism as well as contemporary research on 
it. The year 1968 was chosen because this was when the first arson attack by the 
radicals who would later form the RAF. 1993 was chosen because it was the year of 
the last noteworthy left-wing terrorist attack in West Germany.
3.1 West German terrorism 1968-1993
The wave of terrorism that plagued Europe 1968-1993 was rather intense, more so 
than most seem to recall today. In 1970-1978 alone, some 3,500 acts of terrorism 
were perpetrated in Europe (Hansén & Nordqvist 2005, p. 233). During the period, 
three terrorist organisations achieved a high degree of notoriety in West Germany; 
the  Red Army Faction (RAF),  the Socialist Patients' Collective (SPK)  and the 
Movement 2 June (M2J). The three groups were originally independent of each 
other and had different doctrines. RAF was mostly Marxist-Leninist, the M2J was 
mostly anarchist and the SPK had its own strange doctrine of revolution for the sake 
of the mental health of its members (Huffman 2004).
The immediate origins of West German terrorism can be traced to the 2nd of 
June 1967 when the student Benno Ohnesorg was shot dead during a demonstration 
by a police officer. The act was particularly provoking since the police officer shot 
the pacifist Ohnesorg in the head at close range. This incident is the basis for the 
name “Movement 2 June”. The year after, the left-wing activist Rudi Dutschke was 
nearly killed after being shot by a lone right-wing extremist. Also in 1968, only 
nine days before the Dutschke incident, the would-be founders of West German 
terrorism comprising  Andreas Baader and  Gudrun  Ensslin  were involved in  a 
firebombing action against empty department stores, claiming the West German 
passiveness  towards  the  Vietnam War  as  their  motive.  Although  they  were 
convicted of arson, their objective does not seem to have been to kill anyone. This 
was also stated in testimonies by the accused (Hansén & Nordqvist 2005, pp. 26-
34). 
The future members of the Red Army Faction, linked the violence perpetrated 
against the Jews during WWII, Martin Luther King and Gandhi with the domestic 
incidents related to Benno Ohnesorg and Rudi Dutschke. Gudrun Ensslin said in 
1967  that  “[w]e  must  organise a  resistance! Violence  can  only  be  met  with 
violence! This is the Auschwitz generation, there is no arguing with them!”[my 
translation] (Hansén & Nordqvist 2005, p. 29). Ulrike Meinhof stated in 1970 that 
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“the bullets which hit Rudi... ended the dream of non-violence” [my translation] 
(Hansén & Nordqvist 2005, s. 45). In the same communiqué, Meinhof also made 
references to the police as “the pigs”, proclaiming that those who did not defend 
themselves would perish. The sentence “[d]id the pigs who fired first think that we 
would let ourselves be slaughtered like cattle?” [my italics] shows that Meinhof's 
interpretation was that the RAF was responding to violence, not instigating it. They 
linked these events with themselves and saw in them what they thought would be 
their own fate if they did not “defend themselves”, i.e. resort to armed struggle. 
Thus, they abandoned the “peaceful” methods they had used during the nocturnal 
fire-bombing of the department stores and switched to full-fledged armed warfare. 
During their campaign, their most common targets were US military personnel, the 
West German authorities and leading businessmen.
Their  struggle  was  not  directed  at  the  West  German  state  primarily  for 
grievances specifically committed by it but rather at the West German state as a 
representative of the global capitalist system they sought to disrupt. One of their 
early manifestos state  that  their  goal  was  to  illustrate  the  vulnerability of  the 
German state,  to  carry on  the  global  anti-imperialist  struggle  and  to  link  the 
international struggle to the national by combining political and armed struggle 
(Hansén & Nordqvist 2005, p. 50). On one hand, the RAF manifesto stated that they 
did not believe in a sudden West German revolution but on the other hand they 
made the above mentioned references to international and national struggle, making 
the whole document quite confusing. The lack of any defined practical goals shows 
that  their  campaign  was  primarily  ideological.  The  repeated  attacks  on  US 
personnel and leading businessmen also indicate that the West German authorities 
were not the only targets.
Initially, the RAF enjoyed some public support. In 1971, a survey showed that 
40% of the respondents interpreted the RAF's motives as political, not criminal. 
20% stated that they could understand people who helped RAF members hide from 
the police. 6% stated that they were themselves prepared to hide RAF members. 
The  support  for  the  RAF quickly  started  to  dissipate  shortly  thereafter  when 
confrontations  between the  RAF and law enforcement  officers started to cause 
casualties on both sides (Hansén & Nordqvist 2005, p. 51).  
3.1.1 The global inspiration
The RAF, like many other ideological terrorist organisations in West Germany in 
1968-1993, frequently mentioned Latin America in general and Carlos Marighella 
and his Minimanual for the Urban Guerilla in particular as a source of inspiration 
and  instruction  (Huffman  2004). Even though  Marighella  and  his  other  Latin 
American counterparts to a large extent seem to have shared the Marxist-inspired 
revolutionary ideology with their West German successors, there is a significant 
difference; the Latin American urban guerillas fought for mostly practical reasons, 
their European successors fought for mostly ideological reasons. Laqueur states that 
the  reason  the  Latin  American  revolutionary  movements  resorted  to  “urban 
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guerilla” methods a.k.a. urban terrorism, is because it was simply more practically 
useful in Latin America than traditional guerilla warfare (Laqueur 1987, p. 245-
251).  The  Latin  American guerillas  were fighting  in  one  of  the  most  rapidly 
urbanising regions in the world at the time, the Maoist approach of launching a 
rural armed movement with the goal of encircling and conquering the cities was 
simply not realistic. Their objectives were nevertheless primarily focused around 
toppling their own governments in the name of revolution in order to address local 
grievances. 
The 1960s and 1970s were heavily coloured by the struggles between left-wing 
revolutionary guerillas  in  various  third  world countries  as  well  as  the  war  in 
Vietnam. These events inspired and  outraged  students and  radicals in  Europe, 
making them protest openly in demonstrations. Although the police response could 
be quite violent, it was nevertheless a far cry from the brutality that characterised 
the  fight  between  guerillas  and  authorities  in  South  America.  The  terrorists, 
however,  linked  global  events  with  individual  and  sporadic  acts  of  violence 
occurring locally.  The West German ideological  terrorists  had little  in terms of 
practical  objectives  and  motives.  Police,  government,  law  enforcement  and 
capitalism in general became their targets not primarily because of practical reasons 
but because of ideological reasons. Unlike the Narodnaya Volya in Russia during 
the late 19th century, the West German left-wing terrorists of the 1968-1993 period 
did not fight because they were prohibited to spread propaganda peacefully. Their 
grievances, capitalism and imperialism, were primarily global, not local. Another 
indication of this is their involvement with the Palestinian cause; they participated 
in several terrorist acts in support of the Palestinians, for example the attack on the 
OPEC  headquarters  in  1975  in  cooperation  with  the  infamous  Carlos  and 
Palestinian PFLP terrorists (Hansén & Nordqvist 2005, p. 230). 
3.2 Contemporary theories and research
In 1987, when the wave of European terrorism was dissipating, the well-known 
terrorist expert Walter Laqueur (1987, p. 86) wrote; “The mixture of brutality, self-
pity and  whining,  characteristic  of  much  of  contemporary terrorism, was  quite 
uncommon during the last century”. In addition, Laqueur also stated that “Latin 
American or Arab terrorists may be fervent patriots or feel the injustice done to 
their people as acutely as the terrorists of an earlier age, but they still belong to a 
different species” (Laqueur 1987, p. 92-93). The key difference noted by Laqueur 
was that “[t]he driving force is hate not love, ethical considerations are a matter of 
indifference to them and their dreams of freedom, of national and social liberation 
are suspect” (Laqueur 1987, p. 93). Laqueur thus contextualised the contemporary 
terrorists, making a sharp distinction between the terrorists of the past, who could 
somehow be at least vaguely understood and the terrorists of his time, whom he 
considered to be driven by little more than a desire for mayhem. 
Rasch (1979,  p.  79-80) noted that his  contemporary colleagues in academia 
attempted to explain the appearance of  West German terrorism by resorting to 
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various psychological theories and clinical criminology. In the end, these theories 
did not yield satisfying results and were forgotten. Rasch himself stated that his 
conclusion was that the terrorists he had studied were not paranoid or otherwise 
mentally ill and thus discarded all such explanations. 
The tendency to contextualise terrorism is clear in the two above examples. 
Laqueur  dismisses  contemporary  terrorism in  the  1970s  and  1980s  as  being 
motivated  by  little  more  than  sheer  love  of  carnage.  Rasch  describes  the 
unsuccessful  attempts  to  dismiss  it  as  psychological  conditions  among  its 
perpetrators. Although Laqueur attempts to compare the terrorism of his time with 
historical examples, he does not seem to be able to treat the contemporary terrorism 
as objectively as that of the distant past.
3.3 The decline of West German terrorism
The last major “offensive” of West German terrorism was the so-called “German 
autumn”  of  1977  when  the  “second  generation”  of  the  RAF  carried  out 
assassinations,  attempted  attacks  and  a  high-profile  kidnapping  as  well  as  a 
hijacking  operation  carried out  by  a  Palestinian team in  support  of  the  West 
Germans. Their primary objective was to secure the release of the incarcerated first 
generation of the RAF. Despite all the efforts of the second generation, the founders 
of the RAF were not released from prison. During the year, the former leaders 
instead committed suicide; Andreas Baader, Jan-Carl Raspe and Gudrun Ensslin all 
died  on  the  17-18th October. Irmgard Möller  survived after  attempting suicide 
during the same night. (Huffman 2005). Most of the second generation were later 
apprehended in the years leading up to the 1980s (Huffman 2004). 
Some RAF cells remained active throughout the 1980s, but never on a scale 
similar to that during the 1970s. Only a handful of terrorists remained. The M2J 
was disbanded, most of its members instead joined the RAF. The SPK had ceased 
to exist as early as 1971 and by the mid-1970s, many of the remaining former 
members had instead joined the RAF (Huffman 2004). The “third generation” could 
never match the first and second. In 1993, there was a single high-profile bomb 
attack against a prison but nothing more. Finally, in 1998, a communiqué was sent 
out to the media announcing the formal disbanding of the RAF.
As previously mentioned, the support for the RAF started to drop significantly 
in  1971  following  the  first  deaths  among  law  enforcement  officers  during 
confrontations with the RAF. During the mid- to late 1970s, most of the operations 
carried out by the second generation of the RAF were intended to secure the release 
of  imprisoned terrorists.  This  meant that  the  bulk of  West German ideological 
terrorists were pursuing a battle of self-preservation rather than fighting for their 
original far-reaching goals. As public support for the terrorists dropped and their 
fight seemed more and more meaningless, the basis for their very existence was 
dissolving underneath their feet. 
The change in global context brought by the end of the relatively warm relations 
between the US and the Soviet Union and the new cultural influences of the 1980s 
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finally halted the wave of West German terrorism. When nearly no new recruits 
appeared, only some of the remaining terrorists to whom the struggle had already 
become personal  kept  fighting.  Eventually they were  apprehended and the  few 
would-be replacements lost their nerve and without the previous inspiration, they 
ceased their terrorist activities after 1993. That the sudden withdrawal of foreign 
funding from Stasi played a major role seems highly unlikely considering that the 
RAF started to deteriorate rapidly in the early 1980s, when, according to Epstein 
(2004, p. 324) the Stasi was growing and expanding.
3.4 Summary
The bulk of the West German terrorist groups; the SPK, the M2J and the RAF, were 
clearly ideological rather than practical. The primary indicator is that the groups in 
question started out as ideological groups who later decided to imitate their Latin 
American role-models and strike out violently against the West German state and 
global capitalism, in support of the Palestinian cause and against US military targets 
in retaliation for the Vietnam War. This multitude of targets show what a wide and 
also  abstract  platform these  groups  had.  For  example, for  a  practical terrorist 
organisation striving towards the overthrow of a government, it makes little sense to 
waste resources and personnel on fruitless attacks on US military installations and 
participation in Palestinian actions. This type of scattered acts violence makes sense 
only to the organisation that fights for a broader cause, one that is not confined to 
one's own territory or easily defined political objectives.  
The wave of West German ideological terrorism was born out of the global 
context of the radicalism of the late 1960s, the Vietnam War movement and the 
Latin American guerilla wars. The small-scale political violence in West Germany 
perpetrated by police and right-wing extremists in 1967-1968 was hardly unique to 
that era, in many ways it is similar to the violent clashes between protesters and 
police that we've seen rather recently during anti-globalisation rallies.  The main 
difference is that the global context then provided sufficient inspiration to some 
radicals, their local context merely added a little fuel to an already burning fire. 
Their dependency on the global context becomes more clear in the light of the 
changes occurring in the 1980s. New recruits were no longer appearing and the 
global radicalism that had such an impact on the Western world during the 1960s 
and 1970s had blown over and been replaced by the materialism of the 1980s. This 
spelled  death for  West  German terrorism. Some remaining  hardcore  members 
managed to keep the banner flying for a few years longer but everyone knew that 
the  RAF had become a  shadow of  its  former self  and  the  M2J  and SPK had 
disappeared completely. 
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4 Terrorism of the present
In this chapter, I present empirical data on Islamic terrorism 1998-2005. I have set 
1998 as the start date since this was the year when the US embassies in Tanzania 
and Kenya were  bombed and references to  Al-Qaeda and bin  Ladin started to 
appear internationally. 2005 was chosen because it  was the year of the London 
bomb  attack.  Below,  I  describe briefly  how  Islamic  terrorism has  developed 
between 1998 and 2005 and how my theoretical framework can be applied to it. In 
addition, I also discuss the similarities between Islamic terrorism 1988-2005 and 
West German terrorism 1968-1993.
4.1 Islamic terrorism 1998-2005
The most prominent Islamic terrorist organisation in the post-9/11 global context is 
without a doubt the shadowy Al-Qaeda, personified by its mysterious leader Usama 
bin Ladin. He was previously a well-known figure in the struggle against the Soviet 
Union in Afghanistan in 1979-1989 (Peste 2003, p. 125). During this conflict, the 
basis for what it today known as Al-Qaeda was created (Peste 2003, p. 282) In a 
communiqué and interview in 1998, bin Ladin expressed threats against the United 
States. Later the same year, the US embassies in Tanzania and Kenya were bombed 
in terrorist attacks.
The  September  11  2001  attack  perpetrated  by  Al-Qaeda  was  the  most 
significant indication of the shift from local to global. According to Doran (2003), 
the attack itself was an attempt to influence the global context by provoking a US 
retaliation that would create polarisation between the Muslim communities across 
the globe and the US. The attack had an enormous impact on the global context and 
the subsequent US “war on terror” and conflict in Iraq spawned new local contexts 
as  well  as  laying  the  foundation  for  a  global  context  that  started  producing 
ideological  terrorists without  direct  links  to  neither  the  old  nor  the  new local 
contexts. Two of the most notable terrorist actions after 9/11 are the bomb attacks 
in Madrid in 2004 (Nash 2006) and in London in 2005 (Report into the London 
Terrorist Attacks), both of which were perpetrated by homegrown terrorists.
4.1.1 The global inspiration
Many claims and speculations have been presented as explanations to the motives 
of Al-Qaeda and bin Ladin but few focus on actual communiqués and statements. In 
the fatwa published in 1998 by bin Ladin and three other extremist leaders, three 
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main grievances are listed. The first being the US presence in Saudi Arabia, the 
second being the US actions in Iraq, the third being US support for Israel. The 
fatwa states that the US is indulging in “aggression” and “occupation”, that the US 
is trying to “repeat the horrific massacre” in Iraq and supporting “the murder of 
Muslims” perpetrated by the Israeli state (Nacos 2005, p. 114). 
These statements can clearly be interpreted as describing a perceived threat, i.e. 
bin Ladin sees Americans as a threat to him personally, albeit on a religious/cultural 
level. The fact that Americans are thought of as being responsible for “aggression” 
and “occupation” indicate that they are perceived as the aggressors, the instigators 
of conflict. The idea of oneself as a victim seems common among Islamic terrorists, 
as indicated by an  interview study of  35 incarcerated  Middle Eastern terrorists 
carried out by Post, Sprinzak & Denny (2005, p. 23). This is similar to Meinhof's 
above mentioned statement in which the RAF declare that they are abandoning the 
peaceful struggle in favour of an armed one because of the perceived aggression on 
behalf of the authorities. In bin Ladin's case, his widely defined group to which he 
feels that he is affiliated and which he feels is threatened is easy to pinpoint as 
being people of the Muslim faith. 
Bin Ladin and Al-Qaeda are unusual phenomena in the sense that they have 
transcended  from  being  primarily  concerned  with  the  local  context,  being 
Afghanistan during the war against the Soviets, to the global context, being the 
struggle against the US involvement in the Middle East in general. I interpret Bin 
Ladin's  references to the Palestinian cause and to Israel  as influences from the 
global context since bin Ladin is not a part of the local context of that conflict, 
being a wealthy Saudi by birth. Although bin Ladin is not an Afghani native, he did 
fight the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan in a conflict which was practical 
and local in nature; the removal of Soviet influence over Afghani politics. The later 
struggle against the US, on the other hand, is being fought all over the globe and 
has lost much of its practical dimensions. One of the earlier listed reasons, being the 
removal of the Americans from Saudi soil, is no longer the factor it used to be 
following the US troop withdrawals from Saudi Arabia in 2003. 
4.2 Contemporary research and theories
Kegley (2003, p. 4) claims that there are a number of factors that makes post-9/11 
terrorism “new”. He argues that contemporary terrorism, unlike the terrorism of the 
past  is;  global;  lethal; novel in  sheer size,  destructiveness and professionalism; 
waged by civilians without state sanction; reliant on the most advanced technology, 
orchestrated  by  transnational  non-state  organisations;  pursued  by  fanatical 
extremists to annihilate through maximum bloodshed rather than to convince or 
persuade;  outside  moral  and  legal  norms  that  were  universally  accepted  for 
centuries; predicated on the principle that the power to destroy is equal to the power 
to change and control and; driven by hatred. Similar theories have been expressed 
by for example Whittaker (2007) and Nicholson (2005).
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Armstrong (2005, pp. 14-17) states that the root causes of Islamic terrorism are 
related to the fact that Muslim countries have had to modernise much more quickly 
than the West and that this creates tensions and hostility among people who feel 
that their traditional values and way of life are threatened.
The theories of these two scholars are examples of commonly held opinions 
regarding the Islamic terrorism of today. Below, I argue that these two views are 
too narrow and that Islamic terrorism is not as new nor unique as Kegley suggests 
nor as easily explained as Armstrong claims. 
4.3 What's truly new?
Kegley seems to have conveniently forgotten that the terrorism of 1968-1993 was 
quite global  and relied on transnational links too. West German RAF members 
trained with Palestinian terrorists in the Jordanian deserts (Hansén & Nordqvist, p. 
46), the OPEC executives in Vienna in 1975 were attacked by an international team 
of terrorists comprising among others West German and Palestinian terrorists led by 
the Latin American “Carlos the Jackal” (Laqueur 1987, p. 220). In addition, the 
attack on the Israeli airport in Lod in May of 1972 was carried out by the Japanese 
Red Army (ibid.). Laqueur also states that “A new 'international brigade' came into 
being, able and willing to co-operate on both the strategic and tactical level all over 
the globe, provided the terrorist campaigns happened to be of interest and profit”. 
During the 1970s and 1980s, there was a transnational network of Palestinian, 
West  German,  Italian  and  Japanese  terrorists,  to  mention  but  a  few  of  the 
nationalities  involved.  These  terrorists  received  some  piecemeal  support  from 
nations in the East Bloc, most notably the East German Stasi, but were mostly 
autonomous and unsanctioned (Laqueur 1987, p. 276; Epstein 2004, p. 330 ).
As far as moral and legal norms are concerned, it seems rather absurd to claim 
that the wave of terrorism in 1968-1993 was somehow in line with these norms 
despite the brutality and violence perpetrated. The “driven by hatred” and “lethal” 
factors  are  hardly  new  either.  The  RAF usually  referred  to  law  enforcement 
personnel as “pigs” and one M2J member upon hearing that his wife had injured a 
police officer by shooting him in  the foot stated that  “she  should have aimed 
higher” (Hansén & Nordqvist 2005, pp. 45-46, p. 90).
Kegley is, however, correct in stating that contemporary Islamic terrorism is 
novel in sheer size and destructiveness. An attack on the scale of 9/11 is indeed 
hard to find in the history of terrorism. As far as the professionalism and use of 
technology arguments are concerned, I am more sceptical. The RAF assassination 
of  Alfred Herrhausen, to mention one example, featured expert knowledge and 
advanced use of explosives, detonation devices and electronics (Huffman 2004). 
  Based on the above, I argue that contemporary Islamic terrorism is neither 
something new nor unique. Consequently, since it's not something new nor unique, 
I  argue that  the  true  core  of  the  explanation  is  less  related  to  the  particular 
circumstances of this case than Armstrong & Kegley claims. Armstrong's theory 
cannot explain why people who have been born and raised in Western countries 
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would react to the quick modernisation process in Muslim countries by turning into 
terrorists. 
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5 Conclusions
I have above presented my theory and empirical data which I consider supports it. 
In essence, my main argument is that contemporary terrorism, except for a few 
novelties,  shares  common  traits  with  the  terrorism  of  the  past,  despite  the 
differences in religious/political doctrine. Thus, theories on terrorism need not be 
limited to the immediate context. The pattern of re-emerging homegrown global 
terrorists  is  linked to contemporary local conflicts. The West German terrorists 
were  inspired  by  the  Latin  American  guerillas,  the  Vietnam  War  and  the 
Israeli/Palestinian conflict. The Islamic terrorists were inspired by the Gulf War, the 
Israeli/Palestinian conflict and later also by the war on terrorism in Afghanistan and 
Iraq. The appearance of homegrown terrorists can occur without any direct links to 
international terrorist networks. These terrorists will be inspired by other terrorists 
but may not necessarily ever have had contact with them. One important motivation 
is a perceived threat against a loosely defined group with which one feels affiliated, 
for example for political or religious reasons. 
This is why it is so important to understand how the global context is shaped 
and to be prepared for its  consequences.  Thus,  the powers that are targeted  by 
terrorists should carefully consider their impact on the global context and the effect 
it has of potentially turning their own citizens into terrorists. Creating new local 
conflicts with a potential of spawning new practical terrorists will only increase the 
likelihood of inspiring more ideological terrorists around the globe. Thus, the local 
conflicts should be the primary focus of any attempts to curb terrorism. Not by 
destroying the organisations since they will only re-emerge in new shapes or guises 
but by presenting solutions that are acceptable to all parties, including the people 
from which the terrorists are recruited.
5.1 9/11 in a historical perspective
Many authors pay considerable attention to the fact that 9/11 was an attack on a 
scale never seen before in  the history of  terrorism. While this  is  true  and not 
something to be taken lightly, one should also keep in mind that terrorists can learn 
from the past. Thus,  the scale and ferocity of the 9/11 attack may be a logical 
consequence of  having  a  wide  definition  of  “the  enemy”  along  with  highly 
destructive means of launching an assault at this enemy. The terrorists of the past 
had little empathy for their enemies and frequently disregarded the risk of injuring 
innocent people. Could 9/11 not be a continuation of this trend on a larger scale? As 
terrible as it is, I do not think it is something radically new. As stated above, Doran 
(2003) argues that the primary objective of 9/11 was a symbolic strike intended to 
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create polarisation by provoking a violent response. This polarisation would then 
provide more support for the perpetrators. This is exactly the same line of reasoning 
as Huffman (2004) states was one of the main driving forces behind the terrorism 
acts committed by the RAF. The main difference is that where the RAF attempted 
primarily to produce a domestic effect  through a violent response against  West 
German citizens, Al-Qaeda wanted to achieve a global effect. Their motives were 
nevertheless identical; creating polarisation through violence.
The RAF were ruthless in their attacks too. When they conducted operations 
against US military personnel or representatives of the system they were fighting, 
the  killing  was  in  itself  often  the  purpose  of  the  action,  for  example in  the 
previously mentioned case of the assassination of Alfred Herrhausen. The bombs 
used against US military personnel were intended to maim and kill. The deaths of 
their enemies were to them symbolic acts. 9/11 can be interpreted in a similar 
manner.  The  main  difference  then  is  that  not  only  did  the  terrorists strike at 
symbolic targets,  they had widened their definition of the enemy to include the 
people in and around them. The level of destruction was something new, the motive 
was most likely not.  
5.2 The repeating pattern of global terror
The ideologically motivated terrorist activities in the US and Europe 1998-2005 
seems to have developed different motives than the earlier demands of the 1998 
fatwa. The homegrown terrorists of today seem to be more focused on an abstract 
concept of war against certain Western countries in general rather than achieving 
specific  objectives.  After the Madrid bombings in  2004, modern analysts were 
quick to link them to Al-Qaeda, the “usual suspect” in the modern context of global 
Islamic terror. Ghosh & Graff (2005, p. 93-95) claim that “intelligence experts in 
Washington saw bin Laden's fingerprints in the wreckage” and that “a senior FBI 
counterterrorism veteran” stated that “There's no doubt in my mind it's Al-Qaeda”. 
However, in the light of what we know today, it seems the attack  was carried out 
by individuals who seem to have had no direct link to Al-Qaeda. The Independent 
states that “[w]hile the bombers may have been inspired by Bin Laden, a two-year 
investigation into the attacks has found no evidence that al-Qa'ida helped plan, 
finance or carry out the bombings, or even knew about them in advance” (Nash 
2006).
The essence of  this  example  is  that  the perpetrators were  “inspired by  bin 
Ladin”.  For this  reason,  rather than  any local grievances, they travelled  to the 
country  bin  Ladin had  threatened  and  made that  threat  materialise.  Thus,  the 
contemporary  Islamic  terrorism is  repeating the  pattern  of  1968-1993,  where 
ideological terrorists committed acts of terrorism inspired by the global context in 
support of parties they were not directly affiliated with. The left-wing terrorists in 
1968-1993 identified with and supported the North Vietnamese and FNL guerillas 
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by attacking Americans in Germany and supported the Palestinians through the 
attack on the Lod airport in 1972 (Laqueur 1987, p. 220). 
The Madrid bombings have become yet another example of how ideological 
terrorism can spread without the active involvement of any global network and how 
the contextualised view on terrorism can make even experienced analysts jump to 
incorrect conclusions.
5.3 Learning from the past
My  theoretical  framework indicates  a  connection  between  local  conflicts  and 
homegrown terrorism. It also indicates that as long as the context that made the 
terrorists  appear  persists,  efforts  on  behalf  of  law  enforcement  and  military 
personnel to destroy the terrorist organisations will in most cases only result in 
temporary backlashes. After that, the organisations will recruit new members, form 
a new leadership if need be, and resume their campaign of terror. Only when the 
context has changed sufficiently will the terrorists be vulnerable.  When this has 
occurred, the terrorists may even abandon their struggle voluntarily, as shown by 
the above mentioned SLA, JRA, RAF, IRA and ETA. Some hard core members 
may keep up the struggle for a while longer, trying to regain their previous position. 
The crucial factor is that when the context has changed, they will not be replaced by 
others if arrested or killed. The demise of the terrorist organisation thus becomes 
inevitable. 
My most crucial recommendation based on my conclusions above would be to 
focus counterterrorism efforts primarily on resolving the grievances in the local 
context in order to prevent them from impacting on the global context. Ideological 
terrorists should naturally be contained but to think that they can be eradicated by 
striking out at them or any perceived source of inspiration for them using violent 
means seems improductive at best. Wars against terrorists will most likely only 
create more terrorists. The IRA and ETA examples show that while appeasement 
may not stop the violence, a lengthy and reasonable dialogue very well could have 
far more of an impact than attempts to incarcerate or kill the terrorists. Just as those 
examples show the futility of attempting to destroy terrorist organisations, the RAF 
and SLA examples show that even the most ruthless terrorists can abandon their old 
ways. It may seem like a cliché, but I think it deserves to be repeated; there is 
simply no substitute for dialogue when it comes to conflict management. 
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